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Suppose you supervise the police department of a large Ameri-
can city. In response to rising crime, the city council has authorized
you to hire more officers. Within days your office is flooded with ap-
plications for just a handful of positions. How can you possibly choose
from among them?
One possibility is to screen those applicants initially to eliminate
those who seem unlikely to become successful candidates. Imposing
minimum education and literacy requirements might remove some
applicants from consideration. Another option would be to screen
based on physical ability. After all, many police officers must appre-
hend fleeing criminals, and skills such as strength and stamina could
be measured by requiring applicants to drag or lift a certain amount of
weight or complete a timed run. However, such a test might run afoul
of employment discrimination law, specifically Title VII. Title VII pro-
tects minorities and women from employment practices that discrimi-
nate against them. Since men tend to outperform women on most
physical tests, more men than women will be hired as a result of using
such tests. Consequently, tests based on physical strength can create an
unlawful disparate impact.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991' provides for a "business necessity"
or "job related" defense to disparate impact claims under Title VII.2
Many employers rely on this defense when contesting their liability.
The Act allows an employer to prevail if it proves "that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity.' 3 However, the exact contours of this defense are
still unclear, and lower courts have used a number of different stan-
dards when evaluating the defense, thereby confusing plaintiffs and
defendants alike.
Part I of this Comment reviews the history of disparate impact
analysis and the business necessity defense under Title VII and the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. Part II examines one area where the business
necessity defense crops up quite frequently, the use of physical ability
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1 Pub L No 102-166,105 Stat 1071 (1991), codified in various sections of 42 USC § 2000e
et seq (1994).
2 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
3 Id.
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tests, which tend to favor men over women. Part Ill notes at least four
different standards that have been applied by the courts in the physi-
cal ability test context. Part IV proposes a two-prong test that best re-
flects the command from Congress that any test with a disparate im-
pact be both "job related" and "consistent with business necessity."4
The Comment then applies the proposed test to the physical ability
test context and to disparate impact litigation in general.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits job discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin. When origi-
nally enacted, it was unclear whether Title VII would treat as an "un-
lawful employment practice" a job requirement or employment test
that, while facially neutral, tended to disproportionately exclude
women or racial minorities from a particular position. The Supreme
Court answered that question in the seminal case of Griggs v Duke
Power Co,7 where the Court concluded that even with no finding of
discriminatory intent, an employment test that had a disparate impact
on a protected class could violate Title VII.6 In Griggs, the Court held
invalid a requirement that power plant workers who wished to be
promoted to coal handling positions either have a high school diploma
or pass a standardized intelligence test." The Court found that such a
requirement tended to hinder the opportunity for African-Americans
to earn promotions, and it based its decision, in part, on an analysis of
the workforce of the power plant in question, which showed a wide
disparity between the number of white and African-American coal
handlers. '° The Court was careful to note that not all tests causing adisparate impact in employment opportunities would violate Title VII.
4 Id.
5 42 USC § 2000e et seq (1994).
6 The legislative history indicates that most members assumed Title VII would not apply
to such disparate impact cases. See Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity De-
fense to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 NC L Rev 1479,1481
(1996) (noting that Congress may have intended only to hold employers liable for "intentional
discrimination"). See also 110 Cong Ree S 7213 (Apr 8, 1964) (interpretive memorandum of
Senators Clarke and Case) (declaring that employers need not abandon "bona fide qualification
tests" if members of some groups outperformed members of other groups).
7 401 US 424 (1971).
8 See id at 432 (concluding that "good intent or absence of discriminating intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that ... are unrelated to measuring job
capacity"). Griggs is a statutory rather than a constitutional decision. The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated only by purposeful discrimination, not by ac-
tions that merely create a disparate impact. Washington v Davis, 426 US 229,239 (1976).
9 401 Us at 427-28.
10 Id at 426,430 n 6.
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However, the Act had "placed on the employer the burden of showing
that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question."" In a key passage the Court explained,
"The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to
job performance, the practice is prohibited."'12 Thus in post-Griggs dis-
parate impact cases, one important issue is determining exactly which
tests that create a disparate impact are valid and which violate Title
VII. The phrases "business necessity" and "job related" have become
critical to this analysis, despite the apparent redundancy of these two
terms. After all, in common parlance, if an employment practice is a
business necessity, it seemingly must also be job related.
In its subsequent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court clearly held
that not all tests creating a disparate impact were necessarily a viola-
tion of Title VII. Nevertheless, the Court did little to clarify exactly
when an employment test that had a disparate impact was nonetheless
a reasonable measure of job performance. The Supreme Court next
addressed the issue in Albemarle Paper Co v Moody," where it seem-
ingly adopted a strict standard that would likely render most physical
and written tests invalid.' In Albemarle, a paper plant sought to use in
making its hiring and promotion decisions a written skills test on
which white workers outperformed racial minorities.'5 In affirming a
lower court decision striking down this test, the Court established the
burden-shifting analysis that has become critical to all Title VII dispa-
rate impact claims. First, the plaintiff must establish that the tests in
question select applicants for hire in a "pattern significantly different
from that of the pool of applicants.' '16 If the plaintiff makes this show-
ing of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the employer to validate
that its test is "significantly correlated with important elements of
11 Idat432.
12 Id at 431.
13 422 US 405 (1975).
14 Many written tests tend to discriminate against African-Americans or Hispanics, who on
average are less educated than whites. See NAACP v New York, 413 US 345,363 (1973) (finding
that literacy tests have a greater impact on blacks because of higher white literacy rates); John A.
Powell and Marguerite L. Spencer, Remaking the Urban University for the Urban Student Talk-
ing About Race, 30 Conn L Rev 1247,1287-88 (1998) (noting that black and Hispanic scores on
the SAT and LSAT lag behind white scores). Similarly, physical tests that measure skills such as
strength and stamina tend to discriminate against women who on average are weaker and slower
than men. See Evans v City of Evanston, 881 F2d 382,384 (7th Cir 1989) ("Since men are on av-
erage stronger and faster than women, the higher the passing score on a ... physical agility test
... the smaller the percentage of women likely to pass it."); Timothy H. Goldsmith and Owen D.
Jones, Evolutionary Biology and Behavior: A Brief Overview and Some Important Concepts, 39
Jurimetrics J 131,134 (1998) (finding that men are stronger and 8 percent larger than women).
15 Albemarle, 422 US at 410-11.
16 Id at 425.
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work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job.' 7 Since the
plaintiffs in Albemarle had demonstrated a disparate impact in hiring
and the paper plant was unable to point to any correlation between
test scores and job success among those who had passed the test, the
Court determined that the test was invalid.'
In Dothard v Rawlinson,9 the Supreme Court for the first (and to
date only) time considered the legality of an employment test that had
a disparate impact on women.2 This case also seemed to espouse a
strict standard, although the evidence there was more conflicting. The
plaintiff in Dothard failed to meet a requirement that all Alabama
prison guards be at least five-foot two inches and weigh at least 120
pounds.' Such a rule would have screened out a substantial percent-
age of the female population, but very few men. The state asserted
that its rule was justified because prison guards needed to be strong,
and taller, heavier people tended to be stronger. However, the defen-
dants failed to introduce any statistical evidence, essentially urging the
adoption of a rational basis standard for employer defenses in the dis-
parate impact context.'
The Court declined to embrace such a standard, concluding that
once the plaintiff established a prima facie case of disparate impact,
the burden shifted to the defendant to produce statistical evidence
justifying the need for the test or standard.2 5 In a footnote frequently
cited by those attacking physical tests, the Court implied that employ-
ers could use discriminatory testing mechanisms only under very lim-
ited circumstances: "[A] discriminatory employment practice must be
shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive
a Title VII challenge."26 While alluding to this strict standard, the
Court also stated that if strength really were a bona fide "job-related
quality," it should not be difficult for the state to validate a test that
measured strength directly instead of indirectly through reliance on
height and weight measurements.27
17 Id at 431, quoting 29 CFR § 1607.4(c).
18 Albemarle, 422 US at 431-32. The EEOC has issued guidelines detailing the evidence an
employer must present for a test to be deemed "validated." See 29 CFR § 1607.5(B) (1999).
19 433 US 321 (1977).
20 Id at 331 (finding that height and weight requirements had a disparate impact).
21 Id at 323-24.
22 Id at 329 (noting that the height and weight requirements would exclude 33.29 percent
of all women between 18-79 years of age, but only 1.28 percent of all men).
23 Id at 331.
24 Id. See also id at 339-40 (Rehnquist concurring) (discussing appellants' near total lack of
evidence).
25 Id at 331 ("If the employer discerns fallacies or deficiencies in the data offered by the
plaintif he is free to adduce countervailing evidence of his own.").
26 Id at 331 n 14.
27 Id at 332.
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While implying a strict standard in disparate impact cases, the
Supreme Court did uphold two employment requirements that were
challenged by African-Americans in the late 1970s.2 In New York City
Transit Authority v Beazer2 the Court determined that there was a
"manifest relationship" between a rule against hiring methadone us-
ers and the need to hire employees who would be "safety sensitive. '
Surprisingly, in light of Dothard, the Court did not assess whether the
ban on methadone users was necessary for safe job performance. In-
deed, Justice Stevens' majority opinion found that the transit author-
ity's goals of safety and efficiency were "significantly served by-even
if they do not require- [the methadone] rule."3
In Washington v Davisn the Supreme Court upheld a literacy test
for police trainees in the face of challenges under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and a District of Columbia anti-discrimination statute.
The Court first concluded that a disparate impact cause of action
could not be brought under the Equal Protection Clause, which re-
quires a finding of discriminatory intent.m It then went on to affirm the
district court's finding in favor of the employer on the statutory
claim."5 In upholding the literacy test, the Court noted that "some
minimum verbal and communication skill would be very useful, if not
essential, to satisfactory progress" on the job." While the Court's in-
terpretation of the statute at issue is obviously not controlling on Title
VII analysis, the Court did assume that the relevant standards were
"similar to those obtaining under Title VII" and not "foreclosed by
either Griggs or Albemarle."
B. Wards Cove and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Amidst this muddled precedent, lower courts faced with em-
ployment screening practices that created a disparate impact on a pro-
tected class adopted a variety of formulations of the "business neces-
sity" or "job related" defense.39 To resolve these inconsistent interpre-
28 See New York City Transit Authority v Beazer, 440 US 568 (1979); Washington v Davis,
426 US 229,250 (1976).
29 440 US 568 (1979).
30 Id at 587 n 31, quoting Griggs, 401 US at 432.
31 440 US at 587 n 31.
32 426 US 229 (1976).
33 At the time of the suit, Title VII did not apply to the federal government. See Washing-
ton, 426 US at 236 n 6.
34 Id at 238-39.
35 Id at 248.
36 Id at 250. By contrast, there was no demonstration in Griggs of any need for verbal skills
in the job of coal handling. See Griggs, 401 US at 433.
37 Washington, 426 US at 249.
38 Id at 251.
39 See Part IH.
2000]
The University of Chicago Law Review
tations, the Supreme Court attempted to retreat from the strict busi-
ness necessity test enunciated in some of its earlier opinions by setting
out a clear pro-employer standard in Wards Cove Packing Co v
Atonio."Q In Wards Cove, minority cannery workers alleged that they
were generally given lower paying jobs and restricted in their chances
for promotion because of the disparate impact created by the defen-
41dant company's hiring practices. One of the questions presented was,
assuming the plaintiff made out a case of disparate impact, which
party had the "burden to prove that any disparate impact caused by
[the defendant's] hiring and employment practices was justified by
business necessity.42 The lower court had found that the burden of
proving that a discriminatory test was justified should be placed on
the defendant.43 The Supreme Court, while acknowledging that its
precedent could be read either way on the matter,44 reversed, holding
that the burden of proof should be placed on the plaintiff alleging the
discrimination, and not the employer.45
The primary holding of Wards Cove was this shifting of the bur-
den of proof on the business necessity defense. But the Court at-
tempted to do more than merely shift the procedural burden of proof;
it also sought to lay out the substantive elements of the defense itself.
Once a plaintiff had demonstrated that an employment practice cre-
ated a disparate impact, "the dispositive issue is whether a challenged
practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals
of the employer."'' This standard itself could be seen as vastly more
pro-employer than the Dothard requirement that a challenged prac-
tice be necessary for safe and efficient job performance, and more in
line with the deferential stindard of Beazer.
Dissatisfied with Wards Cove and numerous other Supreme
Court decisions from the October 1988 Term cutting back on the pro-
tections of Title VII;4' Congress was spurred into action. It passed the
40 490 US 642,659-61 (1989).
41 Id at 647-48.
42 Id at 649.
43 Id at 648.
44 Id at 660 ("We acknowledge that some of our earlier decisions can be read as suggesting
otherwise.").
45 Id at 659.
46 Id.
47 See Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v Zipes, 491 US 754, 761 (1989) (re-
stricting circumstances under which a Title VII plaintiff may receive attorney's fees); Patterson v
McLean Credit Union, 491 US 164,179-80 (1989) (holding 42 USC § 1981 inapplicable to private
employment discrimination); Lorance v AT&T Technologies, Inc, 490 US 900, 911-12 (1989)
(limiting Title VII's statute of limitations); Martin v Wilks, 490 US 755 (1989) (allowing white
employees to object to an affirmative action consent decree); Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490
US 228,242 (1989) (holding that employment decision does not violate Title VII if same decision
would have been made irrespective of intentional discrimination).
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Civil Rights Act of 1991 ' to statutorily reverse these decisions. The
Act attempted to codify Supreme Court precedent prior to Wards
Cove by clarifying that if a plaintiff demonstrates disparate impact
caused by an employment practice, he or she will prevail unless the
employer proves "that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity."'' Even
then, the plaintiff can preserve his or her case by demonstrating "an
alternative employment practice" that would not have such a dispa-
rate impact.50
While it is clear that the Act shifted the burden of proof on the
business necessity defense to the defendant, it is less clear if the
Court's substantive interpretation of the defense itself, as set out in
Wards Cove, was also overruled. The use of legislative history to re-
solve this question is foreclosed since the Act explicitly provides that
legislative history may not be considered in interpreting its provisions
aside from a single memorandum." The relevant memorandum states
only that "[t]he terms 'business necessity' and 'job related' are in-
tended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and in the other Supreme Court decisions
prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio., 2 However, because of the
confused state of the cases between Griggs and Wards Cove, the exact
parameters of the business necessity defense are still far from re-
solved."
II. PHYSICAL ABILITY TESTS
The lack of clarity in both Supreme Court jurisprudence and the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 on the contours of the business necessity de-
fense has led to widely varying applications in the lower courts. One
clear example of this problem appears in the realm of physical ability
48 Pub L No 102-166,105 Stat 1071 (1991), codified in various sections of 42 USC § 2000e-2
et seq.
49 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
50 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
51 Pub L No 102-166 § 105(b), 105 Stat 1071,1075 (1991). For a good discussion of the leg-
islative background of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see Spiropoulos, 74 NC L Rev at 1504-13
(cited in note 6).
52 137 Cong Rec S 15276 (Oct25,1991).
53 See Allen v Entergy Corp, 181 F3d 902,904 (8th Cir 1999) (finding that there must be a
manifest relationship between the employment practice and the tested skill); Lanning v South-
eastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 181 F3d 478, 481 (3d Cir 1999) (requiring em-
ployer to prove test measures the "minimum qualifications necessary for successful [job] per-
formance"), cert denied, 120 S Ct 970 (2000); NAACP v Town of East Haven, 70 F3d 219,225 (2d
Cir 1995) (requiring manifest relationship between employment practice and test).
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tests. Physical tests such as obstacle courses,8 mile runs,'8 wall climbs,-6
or hose drags7 have been and often still are used as screening mecha-
nisms for occupations such as police officer and firefighter.3 The va-
lidity of such tests has been subject to much litigation since the Griggs
decision and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.'9 There
are at least two reasons why these tests are frequently litigated. First,
because men have greater exposure to athletic opportunities and are
generally quicker and stronger than women, most physical tests have
the effect of preferring men over women, creating an inherently dispa-
rate impact.60 Because of this, the central issue in most physical test
litigation is not the existence of a disparate impact, but whether or not
the test is job related and consistent with business necessity. In addi-
tion, historically male-only police and fire department positions were
only reluctantly opened to women and still suffer from woeful female
61
representation. Consequently, it is often feared that such tests were
put into place solely to continue discriminatory hiring practices
through facially neutral criteria. Thus at times tests may be used to
conceal disparate treatment that is actually occurring-an illegal de-
sire by some police or fire departments to keep out women.6 On the
other hand, physical tests do provide a neutral screening mechanism
54 See Harless v Duck, 619 F2d 611,616 (6th Cir 1980).
55 See Lanning v Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 181 F3d 478,482 (3d
Cir 1999).
56 See Hardy v Stumpf, 21 Cal 3d 1,576 P2d 1342,1345-46 (1978).
57 See Pietras v Board of Fire Commissioners, 180 F3d 468,471 (2d Cir 1999).
58 Physical tests can of course be used in the private sector, but they appear to be quite
rare. For one example, see EEOC.v Simpson 7imber Co, 1992 US Dist LEXIS 5829, *8-11, *13-
14 (W D Wash) (concluding that although a physical test for private timber company applicants
had a legitimate business purpose, alternatives with a less disparate impact existed).
59 Pub L No 92-261,86 Stat 103,103, codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 2000e et seq (1994)
(extending Title VII to cover state and local governments, which frequently use physical tests in
making hiring decisions).
60 See Zamlen v City of Cleveland, 906 F2d 209,211 (6th Cir 1990) (stating that men tend
to excel at anaerobic functions such as speed and strength). See also note 14 and Ruth Colker,
Rank-Order Physical Abilities Selection for Traditionally Male Occupations as Gender-Based
Employment Discrimination, 19 UC Davis L Rev 761,767-72 (1986) (describing how prior to Ti-
tle VII, women had limited exposure to athletic events and were discouraged from participating
in highly demanding physical sports).
61 See Tim Prenzler, Rebuilding the Walls: The Impact of Police Pre-Entry Physical Ability
Tests on Female Applicants, 7 Current Issues Crim Just 314,324 (1996); Colker, 19 UC Davis L
Rev at 773-75 (cited in note 60) (discussing the resistance to admitting women to the Los An-
geles Police Department); Kevin Flynn, Despite Recruiting, Few Women Do Well in Firefighting
Tests, NY Times Al (Feb 3, 2000) (noting that only thirty-six of New York's 11,000 firefighters
are female).
62 See Legault v Zambarano, 105 F3d 24,26 (1st Cir 1997) (upholding Rule 11 sanctions
against town officials and their attorney who had used a physical test as a sham to conceal that
"[hliring decisions [for fire department positions] were, in fact, based on undisclosed, subjective
criteria within the discretion of the defendants"). See also Hurley v Atlantic City Police Depart-
ment, 174 F3d 95,104 n 5 (3d Cir 1999) (noting frequency of sexual harassment of female police
officers by male coworkers).
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for government agencies forced to decide between hundreds of appli-
cants in cases where the use of subjective criteria or educational and
literacy requirements often lead to disparate impact challenges from
racial minorities.
At least twelve published cases have appeared over the last
twenty years evaluating claims asserted by females seeking to invali-
date physical ability tests." These decisions have diverged widely, split-
ting almost in half on findings of liability and delineating numerous
standards for applying the business necessity defense. The lack of
clarity in the area makes it harder both for employers to design valid
tests and for applicants to successfully press claims of genuine gender
discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 rejected the clear pro-
employer stance of Wards Cove, but, in returning the law to that of
Griggs and its progeny, Congress left a muddled standard that courts
have struggled to apply.
III. STANDARDS FOR ANALYZING PHYSICAL ABILITY TESTS
UNDER TITLE VII
Because the Supreme Court precedent is so confusing and the
terms "business necessity" and "job related" are seemingly redundant,
lower courts have struggled to articulate a rule for analyzing physical
test cases. Essentially, four major standards have developed. From
most to least deferential to employers they are: manifest relationship,
the Spurlock public safety doctrine, close approximation, and mini-
mum qualifications. Because these approaches include standards that
show great deference to employer tests and those that would ban vir-
tually any physical test used as a prerequisite for employment, they
can yield substantially different results when applied to similar physi-
cal tests.
A. Manifest Relationship
The most lenient standard merely requires the defendant em-
ployer to prove a manifest relationship between the physical examina-
tion and successful job performance." This standard is based on the
63 Compare Lanning, 181 F3d 478; Pietras, 180 F3d 468; Berkman v City of New York, 705
F2d 584 (2d Cir 1983); Harless, 619 F2d 611; Blake v City of Los Angeles, 595 F2d 1367 (9th Cir
1979); Legault v aRusso, 842 F Supp 1479 (D NH 1994); Simpson Timber Co, 1992 US Dist
LEXIS at 5829; Brunet v City of Columbus, 642 F Supp 1214 (S D Ohio 1986) (invalidating
physical ability tests), with Zamlen, 906 F2d at 209; Berkman v City of New York, 812 F2d 52 (2d
Cir 1987); Eison v City of Knoxville, 570 F Supp 11 (E D Tenn 1983); Hardy, 576 P2d 1342 (up-
holding physical ability tests). In theory, any protected class could sue for the disparate impact of
a physical ability test, but all published cases have involved claims brought by female applicants
asserting gender bias.
64 See Harless v Duck, 619 F2d 611, 616 n 6 (6th Cir 1980) (discussing the "manifest rela-
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contention in Griggs that an employer must show "that any given re-
quirement [has] a manifest relationship to the employment in ques-
tion."'' Thus, if the employer demonstrates a legitimate business pur-
pose and shows that the test implemented will effectively carry out
that business purpose, the test will survive chalenge. The manifest
relationship standard was used in Eison v City of Knoxville, where a
female police trainee challenged a requirement that all recruits be
able to pass a battery of tests including "sit-ups, push-ups, leg lifts,
squat thrusts, pull-ups, and a two mile run."' While the court did re-
quire the defendant police department to establish that the test was
"job related,"'' this meant only that the score used as a cutoff was not
arbitrary but seemed in some way rational, not that there was any spe-
cific correlation between test success and job success.70 Thus, in Eison,
the court found that a police department could rationally conclude
that attributes such as upper and lower body strength and endurance
were important to the job, and that these attributes could be measured
through the battery of tests established.7 This rendered the test valid
despite the fact that men outperformed women.7
While the manifest relationship standard is quite flexible, it would
not permit every physical test to survive scrutiny. Plaintiffs could pre-
vail by demonstrating a viable alternative for measuring the skills
sought (strength and endurance) that would not have a disparate im-
pact, but there, of course, the burden would be on the plaintiff.7' Also, a
physical test designed through an "intuitive process" with no valida-
tion whatsoever will not be sustained, and validation after the fact will
not suffice.74
While the selected cutoff scores supposedly designed to measure
strength and stamina cannot be arbitrary, any test that measures those
skills could be upheld if properly validated.5 The emphasis of the
tionship" test), citing Dothard, 433 US at 321.
65 Griggs, 401 US at 432.
66 See Eison v City of Knoxville, 570 F Supp 11, 13 (E D Tenn 1983) (upholding physical
test for police cadets). See also Robinson v Lorillard Corp, 444 F2d 791,798 (4th Cir 1971) (ap-
plying manifest relationship test in context of disparate racial impact).
67 570FSupp 11 (ED Tenn 1983).
68 Id at 12.
69 Id at 13. See also Albemarle, 422 US at 425.
70 Eison, 570 F Supp at 13.
71 Id ("All proof showed that the exercises were related to physical traits deemed neces-
sary in police officers.").
72 The court separately noted that under EEOC Guidelines, the plaintiff could only make
out a prima facie case of disparate impact if her police academy class alone was considered the
relevant group of applicants. Id.
73 Id.
74 Harless, 619 F2d at 616 (discussing EEOC validation). See also note 18.
75 Id. The test in Harless required applicants to successfully complete fifteen push-ups,
twenty-five sit-ups, a six foot standing broad jump and an obstacle course. Id at 614.
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manifest relationship standard is thus placed primarily on the em-
ployer's need for the skill in question and a credible demonstration of
some relationship between the test and the skill required for success-
ful job performance. While such a standard might be supported by
some broad language in Supreme Court precedent76 it seems inconsis-
tent with the strict standards often enunciated in the 1970s by the
Court and the attempts by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to reinstate a
more pro-plaintiff interpretation of Title VII.
B. The Spurlock Doctrine
A variant of this first approach follows the manifest relationship
standard in some contexts, but uses a more pro-employee standard in
others. The dividing line is predicated upon whether an employment
position implicates safety concerns. While conceding that Congress
and the Supreme Court have supported closely scrutinizing most em-
ployment tests or requirements, the Spurlock doctrine argues that
these bodies have shown more deference to employers where safety is
at issue.
Thus, some courts have rationalized that employers should face a
lighter burden in proving a "business necessity" when public safety is
a concern related to the job position. Some commentators believe a
dual standard makes better sense of such Supreme Court precedents
as Beazer and Washington that upheld screening mechanisms from
disparate impact challenges in safety-sensitive positions.7' Where the
employment test seems calculated to take into account those safety
concerns, as most physical tests would, the test will be upheld.79 These
76 See Griggs,401 US at 432 ("Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing
that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.");
Washington, 426 US at 250 (upholding literacy test that measured skills "useful, if not essential to
satisfactory progress" on the job); Beazer, 440 US at 587 n 31 (finding "manifest relationship"
between ban on methadone use and the need for "safety sensitive" employees).
77 See Fitzpatrick v City of Atlanta, 2 F3d 1112, 1119-20 (11th Cir 1993) (expressing con-
cerns for public safety in upholding requirement that all firefighters wear breathing apparatus
and remain clean shaven); EEOC v Atlas Paper Box Co, 868 F2d 1487, 1497 (6th Cir 1988) (as-
serting that courts should be more lenient when evaluating employer disparate impact defenses
in jobs affecting public safety); Davis v City of Dallas, 777 F2d 205,211 (5th Cir 1985) (upholding
minimum educational standards as "crucial" to public safety issues when analyzing police em-
ployment requirements); Harris v Pan American World Airways, Inc, 649 F2d 670,675 (6th Cir
1981) (recognizing importance of public safety in airline industry hiring standards); Chrisner v
Complete Auto Transit, Inc, 645 F2d 1251, 1262-63 (6th Cir 1981) (requiring lighter burden for
"business necessity" in screening of long-distance truckers).
78 See Spiropoulos, 74 NC L Rev at 1479 (cited in note 6) (arguing for a two-tiered treat-
ment of the employer disparate impact defense based in part on public safety concerns).
79 A test might still be struck down if it is based on subjective criteria that do not seem to
present a manifest relationship to the safety concern presented. See Banks v City of Albany, 953
F Supp 28,36 (N D NY 1997) (denying summary judgment where fire department test was based
on subjective criteria). Objective tests, like physical ability tests, would usually survive challenge,
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public safety concerns will generally involve positions that have a
great deal of contact with and impact upon the public. For example,
the first case to create this bifurcated standard, Spurlock v United Air-
lines, Inc," involved a requirement that applicants for a pilot position
with a major commercial airline log at least five hundred flight hours.8'
While this requirement had a profoundly disparate impact on minori-
tiesn and the defendant produced no evidence that pilots with fewer
than five hundred hours committed more in-flight errors, the court
still held that United Airlines had demonstrated business necessity
and that the requirement was job related.n The Tenth Circuit ex-
plained that where incalculable "economic and human risks [would
be] involved in hiring an unqualified applicant ... , the employer bears
a correspondingly lighter burden" than in cases involving unskilled
applicants and no public safety concerns. ' Many of the cases that im-
ply a public safety exception to the strict business necessity defense
have involved either public transportation, as in Spurlock and Beazer,
or police departments, as in Washington. Fire departments, where
many physical tests are also used, would seem to implicate similar is-
sues of public safety and economic and human risk." For these rea-
sons, courts evaluating business necessity defenses in the physical test
context have occasionally invoked Spurlock and lightened the burden
on the employer to justify the need for its test.6
While such a standard might make sense of Supreme Court
precedent, the vast majority of these cases were decided prior to the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. A two-tiered standard might be "consistent
with" Supreme Court cases prior to Wards Cove, but there is nothing
in the text of the Act to suggest that the phrase "business necessity"
should involve an entirely different standard in a public safety context
however.
80 475 F2d 216 (10th Cir 1972).
81 Id at 219.
82 Only nine of the airline's 5,900 flight officers were African-American. Id at 218.
83 Id at 220. Applicants with more than five hundred flight hours were significantly more
likely "to succeed in the rigorous training program which United flight officers go through," the
components of which were not specified. Id at 218. Still nearly 90 percent of applicants with
fewer hours did complete the program, and there was no evidence in the record of their on-the-
job performance. Id at 219 & n 1.
84 Id at 219.
85 See Zamlen v City of Cleveland, 686 F Supp 631,654 (N D Ohio 1988) ("The risks to the
public in terms of life, limb and property as a consequence of hiring an unqualified firefighter are
great, resulting in a less heavy burden for demonstrating the job relatedness of the employment
criteria."), affd, 906 F2d 209 (6th Cir 1990).
86 For jobs requiring minimal skill or human risk, the Spurlock court would require the
employer to bear "a heavy burden to demonstrate ... that his employment criteria are job-
related." 475 F2d at 219. While the exact contours are not specified, at least one commentator
has attempted to flesh out a "strict necessity" standard for non-complex jobs. See Spiropoulos, 74
NC L Rev at 1540-46 (cited in note 6).
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than it does in other situations, and the doctrine has never been en-
dorsed explicitly by the Supreme Court." On the other hand, dicta in
the Court's decisions upholding a literacy test for police officers in
Washington and a rule against methadone use among transit employ-
ees in Beazer does lend some support to the idea that the Court im-
plicitly accepted a two-tiered standard." For these reasons, the Spur-
lock doctrine remains controversial.
C. Close Approximation to Job Tasks
A third standard used by several courts in analyzing physical
ability tests focuses on the nature of the test selected by the defendant
employer. When a physical test closely approximates a task the candi-
date would actually perform on the job, it is likely to be upheld.8 For
example, the court in Hardy v Stumpf was faced with a disparate im-
pact challenge to an Oakland police department requirement that
each applicant scale a six-foot wall.9' Because the test "reflect[ed] a
critical duty of Oakland police officers," it closely approximated a job
task and was determined to be valid.2
However, if the test were more of a general fitness exam or an
obstacle course, the court would closely scrutinize the test's disparate
impact and impose a much higher burden on a department imple-
menting the test.93 Thus, while the manifest relationship standard and
the Spurlock doctrine focus on the skill being tested, the close ap-
proximation standard looks primarily at the form of the test itself. The
argument in support of this approach appears to be that the best way
to determine if a test is consistent with business necessity is if the em-
ployee would actually be performing the tasks set out for her in the
physical test in the course of her job. Using this standard, courts have
87 At least one court has concluded that the Spurlock doctrine is more onerous on the de-
fending employer than Wards Cove. See Zamlen v City of Cleveland, 906 F2d 209,217 (6th Cir
1990). Thus, the overruling of Wards Cove does not automatically invalidate the Spurlock doc-
trine.
88 See Washington, 426 US at 252 (finding verbal skills to be important in police officer
training); Beazer, 440 US at 587 n 31 (finding that ban on methadone users was job related on
safety grounds).
89 See Smith v City of Des Moines, 99 F3d 1466 (8th Cir 1996) (finding that breathing test
while wearing firefighting apparatus closely simulated job conditions and, therefore, survived at-
tack under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Hardy v Stumpf, 21 Cal 3d 1, 576 P2d
1342 (1978) (upholding requirement that police officer applicants successfully scale a six-foot
wall as job related because it significantly correlated to an important element of the job).
90 21 Cal 3d 1,576 P2d 1342 (1978).
91 Id at 1344.
92 Id at 1346.
93 See Berkman v City of New York, 705 F2d 584 (2d Cir 1983) (affirming district court
finding that battery of physical tests for firefighter positions was not job related); Legault v
aRusso, 842 F Supp 1479 (D NH 1994) (granting preliminary injunction in favor of female fire-
fighter and invalidating four-part agility test including an obstacle course).
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upheld a requirement that a police officer scale a six foot wall, or run
1.5 miles in 12 minutes because these are "critical duties" performed
in the course of a job.' And the New York City Fire Department
could implement a test including a hose pull and wall vault that simu-
lated engine and ladder company tasks.9 On the other hand, a general
skills test including a pike pole pull, sandbag drag, and stair climb, was
invalid because it did "not represent the physical demands of the
job."9 Under the close approximation standard, a general battery of
physical tests like that approved in Eison would presumably be found
invalid since it does not measure any actual job tasks.9
Courts that require a physical test to closely approximate actual
job tasks tend to focus on language in Albemarle and Dothard that
opposed tests failing to meet this standard. The Court in Dothard
found the height and weight requirements suspect because of a lack of
correlation between the skill desired by the Alabama prisons depart-
ment (strength) and what was actually being measured (weight)." If a
test closely replicates an actual job task, such as a hose pull or a wall
climb, and the employer can demonstrate a rational need for having
the employee perform that task, courts are less suspicious that the test
is masking invidious discrimination or inadvertently screening out
qualified applicants.
The close approximation standard is often tied to the concept of
"content validity." The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") has developed guidelines for validating employment tests.
One of these measures, content validity, is established by "data show-
ing that the content of a selection procedure is representative of im-
portant aspects of performance on the job."" Although the guidelines
do not carry the force of legislative enactments, courts have granted
them deference.n This is especially true in light of the Supreme
94 See Hardy, 576 P2d at 1347 ("[lit is difficult to imagine a more accurate way of testing
ability to scale a six-foot wall than to scale one."); Lanning v Southeastern Pennsylvania Trans-
portation Authority, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 9388, *187-88 (E D Pa) (finding that officers need
aerobic activity to arrest criminals and that requiring potential officers to run 1.5 miles in twelve
minutes appropriately measured this need), revd, 181 F3d 478 (3d Cir 1999).
95 See Berkman v City of New York, 812 F2d 52,54 (2d Cir 1987).
96 Brunet v City of Columbus, 642 F Supp 1214,1250 (S D Ohio 1986). See also aRusso, 842
F Supp at 1489 (finding that the fire department failed to validate an obstacle course as being job
related).
97 See Eison, 570 F Supp at 12 (describing approved fitness test consisting of push-ups,
pull-ups, sit-ups, and two-mile run).
98 See 433 US at 331 ("[T]he appellants produced no evidence correlating the height and
weight requirements with the requisite amount of strength thought essential to good job per-
formance.").
99 29 CFR § 1607.16(D) (1999).
100 See, for example, Association of Mexican-American Educators v California, 195 F3d 465,
486 (9th Cir 1999) (stating that noncompliance with EEOC guidelines diminishes the probative
value of a defendant's validation study); Allen v Entergy Corp, 181 F3d 902, 905 (8th Cir 1999)
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Court's decision to generally require statistical proof of a test's valid-
ity.1
For these reasons, courts have been more sympathetic to a test
replicating job conditions than a mere "fitness test" because the for-
mer measures the component skills that are important to the job.
While courts using this standard generally inquire solely into the rela-
tion between the test and the skill being measured, they may still re-
ject the selection of an arbitrary cutoff score that has no rational rela-
tion to the needs of the job,ln or that has been positively demonstrated
to be unnecessarily high.' °3
D. Minimum Qualifications
The strictest standard to date was recently announced by the
Third Circuit in Lanning v Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority.1 4 At issue was a requirement that all applicants for police
officer positions assigned to the transit authority for the greater
Philadelphia metropolitan area ("SEPTA") successfully run 1.5 miles
in under twelve minutes.' The test had been designed by a fitness
consultant in response to high crime rates within the transit system
and several incidents in which out-of-shape officers were injured or
arrived late to crime scenes.'0 Police officers for the transit authority
usually worked alone, patrolled on foot, and were expected at times to
pursue suspects.'O' The test was designed to measure a specific aerobic
capacity that the fitness consultant and transit authority determined
would be necessary for police officers to have a good chance of ap-
prehending the average criminal. '
When the test was implemented, a total of 55.6 percent of men
were able to pass the test, but only 6.7 percent of women ran the 1.5
(finding that fact that employment test was validated in accordance with Guidelines coupled
with other evidence was sufficient to uphold the test); Brunet, 642 F Supp at 1227 ("Although not
binding on this court, the Uniform Guidelines are entitled to substantial deference.").
101 See Albemarle, 422 US at 431, quoting 29 CFR § 1607.4(C) (requiring employer to show
a written skills test was "significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior").
102 See Pietras v Board of Fire Commissioners, 180 F3d 468,472 (2d Cir 1999) (invalidating
requirement that all firefighter candidates drag a hose 150 feet in under four minutes after find-
ing no rational basis for time selected).
103 See EEOC v Simpson Timber Co, 1992 US Dist LEXIS 5829, *10-11 (W D Wash) (re-
jecting cutoff score used in physical test by timber company after finding that a lower cutoff level
would reduce disparate impact while still measuring job qualifications).
104 181 F3d 478 (3d Cir 1999).
105 Id at 482.
106 See Lanning v Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 1998 US Dist
LEXIS 9388, *7-8 (E D Pa), revd, 181 F3d 478 (3d Cir 1999).
107 Lanning, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 9388, at *4.
108 Lanning, 181 F3d at 482.
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miles successfuly.'° The transit authority conceded that the distinction
in percentage passage rates was enough to create a prima facie case of
disparate impact."" Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the burden of
proving that the test was a business necessity then shifted to the de-
fendants.'
The district court, relying on the close approximation to job tasks
test, held that the defendant had proved that the test was a business
necessity.'12 It accepted the testimony of the fitness consultant regard-
ing the need for physically fit transit police officers, and the ability of
the test to measure that skill. Accordingly, the court granted summary
judgment for the defendant. '13
The Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision and re-
manded the case for further discovery1 14 The court emphasized the
most stringent language appearing in the Supreme Court's Title VII
jurisprudence. 5 The primary justification for this emphasis was the
fact that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was a direct response to Wards
Cove, which had articulated an easier standard for employers to
meet.116 Consequently, the court found that Congress wished to elimi-
nate employment requirements with a disparate impact except in very
narrow circumstances and determined that a strict standard was
needed to accomplish this aim: "[A] discriminatory cutoff score is im-
permissible unless shown to measure the minimum qualifications nec-
essary for successful performance of the job in question., 11 7 While ac-
knowledging the strictness of this standard, the court did not believe it
would require the implementation of quota systems or the hiring of
unqualified applicants. Instead, the court articulated three non-quota
109 Id at 483.
110 Id.
111 See 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (codifying the employer disparate impact defense).
112 Lanning, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 9388 at *147-48 (holding that employer disparate impact
defense allows "employment practices that significantly serve, but are neither required by nor
necessary to, the employer's legitimate business interests").
113 Id at *208-09.
114 Lanning, 181 F3d at 494.
115 Id at 489. See also Albemarle, 422 US at 434 ("The fact that the best of those employees
... score well on a test does not necessarily mean that that test, or some particular cutoff score on
the test, is a permissible measure of the minimal qualifications of new workers entering lower
level jobs."); Dothard, 433 US at 331-32 n 14 ("[A] discriminatory employment practice must be
shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge.").
116 Lanning, 181 F3d at 488 ("By Congress' distinguishing between Griggs and Wards Cove,
we must conclude that Congress viewed Wards Cove as a significant departure from Griggs. Ac-
cordingly, because the Act clearly chooses Griggs over Wards Cove, the Court's interpretation of
the business necessity standard in Wards Cove does not survive the Act.").
117 Id at 489. Compare 29 CFR § 1607.5(H) (1999) (requiring only that cutoff scores "be




options available to SEPTA.18  First, SEPTA could use scores on the
test not as a hiring device but as an incentive program. 9 Second, it
could "validate a cutoff score ... that measures the minimum [qualifi-
cations] necessary to successfully perform the job.'20 Third, SEPTA
could utilize two different cutoff scores-one for men and an easier
one for women.u' Because the district court utilized a different stan-
dard, the case had to be remanded for evaluation of the 1.5 mile run
under the test laid down by the Third Circuit.n
Dissenting, Judge Weis argued that a close examination of the
Supreme Court's Title VII jurisprudence before Wards Cove showed
great deference to employer decisions when public safety was impli-
cated.w He feared that the majority's new minimum qualifications test
would lead to the abandonment of all physical tests and concluded
that the overriding consideration in these cases was the issue of public
safety endorsed in the Spurlock doctrine. 4 Since public safety con-
cerns are implicated in police department hiring decisions, Judge Weis
would have granted summary judgment to SEPTA if it could demon-
strate a manifest relationship between its test and the job require-
ments, a standard more pro-employer even than that used by the dis-
trict court.2
The debate between the majority and the dissent in Lanning is
only another example of the difficulties courts face when evaluating
the use of physical fitness tests as a cutoff for employment purposes.
Because the Supreme Court has yet to interpret this portion of the
1991 Civil Rights Act, courts must struggle to resolve these confused
standards on their own.
18 Lanning, 181 F3d at 490 n 15.
119 Id.
120 Id. The court's reference to validation seems to refer to the validation procedures found
in the EEOC guidelines. However, it is unclear how an employer could validate a minimum cut-
off score under current guidelines, which focus on the qualifications of the test and testing pro-
cedures, and not on any actual score used as the cutoff
121 Id. This third option might be prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which prevents
the "use [of] different cutoff scores for ... employment related tests on the basis of... sex." 42
USC § 2000e-2(i) (1994).
122 Lanning, 181 F3d at 494.
123 See, for example, Albemarle, 422 US at 434 (allowing employment tests that "fulfill a
'genuine business need'); Dothard, 433 US at 320 (concluding that an "employer must show that
a requirement has 'a manifest relationship to the employment in question'), quoting Griggs, 401
US at 432; Beazer, 440 US at 587 n 31 (allowing a test that "significantly served" the goals of
safety and efficiency, even if the test was not required for those goals to be served).
124 See Lanning, 181 F3d at 502 (Weis dissenting).
125 Id at 500.
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IV. A PROPOSED RESOLUTION
In evaluating the business necessity defense after 1991, it is cru-
cial to scrutinize the text of the statute Congress enacted. While can-
ons of statutory construction counsel interpretation of statutes in light
of the prevailing common law, any such interpretation must still make
sense of the current statutory text.' That text contains two require-
ments: the test must be "job related" and it must be "consistent with
business necessity. ' ' While most courts essentially adopt a single
standard to conflate both of these terms, it is possible, and indeed
makes sense, to treat them as two separate requirements, both of
which must be met for an employer to successfully defend the validity
of its test.
The best way to make sense of the statutory text and case law
would be to create a two-prong test for assessing physical ability tests
and other employment screens that create a disparate impact, one ad-
dressing the "job related" requirement and the other assessing the
"business necessity" component. It should be possible for an employ-
ment test to be struck down under either component without auto-
matically implicating the other. At the same time, it should be possible
for employers to muster proof that a given test satisfies both prongs
and thereby persuade a court that the test should be sustained in spite
of its disparate impact.
A. The Two-Prong Test
1. The skill sought to be measured by the employment test is
consistent with business necessity.
A two-prong test also makes sense because most cases evaluating
employment tests emphasize one of two separate concerns. The first is
whether the skill being measured (for example, speed, stamina,
strength, intelligence) by the employment test is actually a prerequi-
site for the job in question. This concern reflects whether or not the
test is "consistent with business necessity" by measuring a skill neces-
sary for job performance. In order to meet the demands of this first
prong, an employer would need to identify the skill or ability the em-
ployment test measures, and prove to the district court's satisfaction a
"manifest relationship" between the skill tested and the job itself; evi-
dence similar to that amassed in Eison.
126 Canons of construction may be even more crucial in interpreting this section of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 because usage of the other major source of statutory interpretation, legisla-
tive history, is largely foreclosed by the text of the Act itself. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L
No 102-166 § 105(b), 105 Stat 1071,1075 (1991).
127 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
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In the context of physical ability tests, most employers would be
able to pass this prong since it is similar to the manifest relationship
standard outlined in Eison and related cases and could be satisfied
through the production of similar evidence of a job's physical de-
mands. Physical skills such as strength, speed, and endurance are gen-
erally rationally related to police and fire department positions.2 Of
course, physical tests might not be manifestly related to a private sec-
tor job, or a position as a police dispatcher. And some tests would fail
to satisfy even the manifest relationship standard.'"
The first prong makes sense because often the first issue that has
confronted courts in employment discrimination cases is whether the
skill tested is actually necessary for the job. Thus, the defendant in
Griggs offered no evidence whatsoever that literacy or basic math
skills, which might possibly be measured by the receipt of a high
school diploma, were necessary for the position of a coal handler at a
power plant.n Literacy was also not shown in Albemarle to be a pre-
requisite for employment as a low-level worker at a paper mill.'3 On
the other hand, the methadone rule in Beazer did significantly serve
the goal of a safe and accident-free transit authority. The Court's pri-
mary concern in these cases seemed to be that employers were actu-
ally using these neutral criteria not to screen out unqualified appli-
cants but to conceal disparate treatment of protected minorities.
Meeting the first prong by proving the business necessity of the skill in
question would serve to rebut such fears.
2. The test itself is clearly job related by closely approximating
an on-the-job task.
The first prong is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for a
successful business necessity defense. Equally important is the re-
quirement that the test selected by the employer accurately gauge that
skill. Thus, if a given skill is found to be a "business necessity" for a
job, then a test that precisely measures that skill is "related" to the job.
Consider the decision in Dothard. The Court left open the possibility
that possession of some amount of strength might be a bona fide pre-
requisite to employment as a prison guard, which would render that
128 See Zamlen v City of Cleveland, 906 F2d 209,218 (6th Cir 1990) (accepting expert testi-
mony that firefighters must possess high degrees of "aerobic capacity and aerobic fitness...
muscle strength, muscular endurance, flexibility, coordination, muscle balance, and speed");
Berkman v City of New York, 812 F2d 52, 59-60 (2d Cir 1987) (finding that "firefighters fre-
quently face situations where their anaerobic abilities determine whether or not they will save
the lives of the fire victims").
129 See notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
130 See Griggs,401 US at 431-32.
131 See Albemarle, 422 US at 431-32.
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skill a "business necessity" under the first prong of the proposed
test. However, the Court required that any test must correlate to
"the requisite amount of strength thought essential to good job per-
formance. ' A simple height requirement at best indirectly correlates
with strength, as short individuals may in many instances be stronger
than those who are taller. A direct measurement is likely to be most
successful if it measures the actual content of the job itself. This "con-
tent validation" is one of the three mechanisms that the EEOC sug-
gests can be used to validate an employment test, and it is best used
for skills that are easily measurable (as opposed to abstract thinking
skills or leadership). 4 Since physical strength and stamina are con-
crete skills, it should not be unduly burdensome for an employer to
devise tests that closely approximate job tasks."' Thus, in the physical
ability test arena, "job relatedness" is likely to become synonymous
with the language "closely approximates a job task" found in numer-
ous opinions over the years."" In addition, an employer would proba-
bly have to show that the cutoff score is also rationally calibrated to
approximate necessary on-the-job skills, although that score need not
be the absolute minimum required for job performance. '3'
To summarize, the best interpretation of the business necessity
defense to a disparate impact claim codified in the Civil Rights Act of
1991 would uphold the test only when the employer produces evi-
dence that its test closely approximates and effectively measures ("job
related") a skill that is important to successful job performance ("con-
sistent with business necessity").
132 See Dothard, 433 US at 331-32 (accepting possibility that state could validate a test that
measured strength directly, even if such a test created a disparate impact).
133 Id at 331.
134 See 29 CFR § 1607.16(E)-(F) (1999). See also 20 CFR § 1607.14(C)(1) (1999) (stating
that content validity studies are inappropriate for measuring such skills as "intelligence, aptitude,
personality, commonsense, judgment, leadership, and spatial ability").
135 Devising such a test would not be costless of course. Since the Civil Rights Act places
the burden of proof on the defendant, any employer would be well advised to secure an expert
to devise the test and validate it in accordance with EEOC procedures. A mere assertion of job
relatedness "bereft of any evidence" is still unlikely to survive judicial scrutiny. See Pietras v
Board of Fire Commissioners, 180 F3d 468,472 & n 5 (2d Cir 1999) (invalidating timed hose pull
in the face of total lack of evidence that time chosen "reflected the needs of the job").
136 See Fitzpatrick v City of Atlanta, 2 F3d 1112,1120 (lth Cir 1993) (upholding test meas-
uring breathing capacity while wearing firefighter's mask); Zamlen v City of Cleveland, 906 F2d
209, 218-19 (6th Cir 1990) (accepting a hiring test that simulated actual firefighting tasks);
Hardy, 576 P2d at 1342 (upholding the requirement that police cadets climb a six-foot wall as re-
flecting important police skills).
137 See Pietras, 180 F3d at 471 (invalidating cutoff score that was the average of all previous
test-takers and not related in any way to job performance).
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B. Benefits of the Two-Prong Test
1. Consistent with statutory text.
An important canon of construction requires courts to give
meaning to the entire statutory text if possible." If there are two pos-
sible readings of a statute, one of which "renders some words alto-
gether redundant," the other reading should be preferred. ' It is pre-
sumed that Congress knows what it is doing in enacting statutory text
and does not include words that are unnecessary for understanding
the statute. '4
The best interpretation of the business necessity defense under
the standard would be one that gives meaning both to the phrase "job
related" and to the phrase "consistent with business necessity." In-
deed, at least one court favoring a strict standard has argued that the
manifest relationship standard violates this principle by requiring only
that the physical ability test be related to the job in question without
evaluating the business necessity of the practice.
141
At the same time, it could equally be argued that a stringent
minimum qualifications test creates the same problem by writing out
the job relatedness standard at the expense of the business necessity
language. If "consistent with business necessity" defines a test that
measures the minimum qualifications necessary for successful job per-
formance, it seems impossible to conceive of a test that would meet
such a standard and yet not be job related. In that case, the "job relat-
edness" prong of the business necessity defense would become irrele-
vant.
The two-prong test is more consistent with statutory text than the
options currently outlined by courts because it recognizes the inherent
difficulty in applying a single standard to cover the two separate terms
"job related" and "consistent with business necessity." By bifurcating
these terms, focusing the attention of one on the job relatedness of the
employment test itself and the other on the business necessity of the
138 See United States v Gonzalez, 520 US 1, 8 (1997) (giving meaning to entire statutory text
by disregarding legislative history); Walters v Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc, 519 US
202,209 (1997) (requiring that each word of a statute be given meaning); United States v Nordic
Village, Inc, 503 US 30,36 (1992) ("[A] statute must, if possible, be constructed in such fashion
that every word has some operative effect.").
139 Gustafson v Alloyd Co,513 US 561,574 (1995).
140 McNary v Haitian Refugee Center, Inc, 498 US 479,496 (1991) (presuming that Congress
has knowledge of basic rules of statutory construction); John E Manning, Constitutional Structure
and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum L Rev 612, 625
(1996) ("[T]he Court routinely presumes that Congress enacts statutes against an interpretive
background that includes the Court's norms of construction.").
141 See Lanning, 181 F3d at 489 ("Judicial application of a standard focusing solely on
whether the qualities measured by an entry level exam bear some relationship to the job in ques-
tion would impermissibly write out the business necessity prong of the Act's chosen standard.").
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skill being tested, each can be given statutory meaning without caus-
ing "job related" to be swallowed up or "consistent with business ne-
cessity" to be ignored.
In addition, it is crucial to note that the Civil Rights Act requires
only that an employment practice be consistent with business neces-
sity. 2 Implementing a standard like the minimum qualifications test
requires the test to, in essence, be a business necessity, writing the
word "consistent" out of the statute. Thus, in evaluating whether a test
is consistent with business necessity, the focus must lie not on the test
itself, as it is under the minimum qualifications standard, but on the
skills being measured by the test. If those skills are consistent with the
needs of a safe and efficient business, the test is valid.'
At the same time, the proposed two-prong test clearly goes far-
ther than either the manifest relationship standard or the Spurlock
doctrine. The Spurlock exception, while containing many valid con-
cerns about public safety, is not supported by the text of the statute;
there is simply no distinction made on the statute's face between pub-
lie and private employers or between jobs that do and do not impact
public safety.' While many of these safety concerns can still be evalu-
ated when assessing the skills necessary for job performance,45 they
should not be taken into account as independent considerations.'"
2. Consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
The interpretive memorandum accompanying the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 explicitly requires that the Act be applied consistent with
Supreme Court decisions predating Wards Cove.'4 Therefore, no in-
terpretation of Title VII's current statutory language is acceptable if it
does not reflect the meaning of the terms "business necessity" and
"job related" as they were articulated in those precedents.'" Any test
must, at a minimum, both correctly incorporate the five major Su-
142 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
143 See Beazer, 440 US at 587 & n 31 (upholding rule banning methadone users from em-
ployment in "safety sensitive" positions). Just as the skill or qualification in Beazer was safe job
performance, so in physical tests the skill of strength or stamina should be judged based on the
needs of the police or fire department in question.
144 See text accompanying note 87.
145 See Part IV.B.4.
146 By endorsing the manifest relationship standard in the public safety context, Spurlock
also retains that standard's shortcoming. of essentially writing the "business necessity" compo-
nent out of the statute. See text accompanying note 141.
147 See Interpretive Memorandum, 137 Cong Rec S 28680 (Oct 25,1991).
148 While dicta in Wards Cove itself found the Court's precedents to endorse a manifest re-
lationship or Spurlock standard, see Wards Cove, 490 US at 659-60, that analysis cannot bear on
interpretation of the Act, which explicitly orders interpreting courts to rely on decisions prior to
Wards Cove. See 137 Cong Rec S 28680. ,
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preme Court Title VII precedents 9 and harmonize their reasoning.
The two-prong test does this by recognizing that Griggs and its prog-
eny were actually focused on two different problems in their language
and rhetoric: the problem of employers testing skills that are unneces-
sary for job performance (i.e., business necessity) and the problem of
tests that incorrectly measure necessary skills (i.e., job relatedness).
Thus, when the Court notes that "[t]he touchstone is business neces-
sity""' , and that a practice must be necessary for safe and efficient per-
formance,'5 it is mainly focusing on the skills being tested: literacy
among coal handlers or strength among prison guards. '5 But when the
court seeks a "demonstrably ... reasonable measure of job perform-
ance,"' 53 it is questioning whether the test itself is a close approxima-
tion or an adequate measure for that skill.
3. Consistent with purposes of Title VII.
The primary goal of Title VII was to prevent discriminatory hir-
ing practices. While there is much debate over the exact scope and
purpose of disparate impact analysis,55 at a minimum, disparate impact
analysis should halt practices that appear likely to mask discrimina-
tory treatment or that do not produce any countervailing benefits to
the employer.f An employment test that fails to measure accurately a
job's requirements and that creates a disparate impact provides an
employer with no legitimate benefits or efficiencies and harms society
by reducing job opportunities for females or minorities. If the courts
can successfully identify such cases, they should act to rectify the
problem.
In the context of physical ability tests, the two-prong test does a
good job of addressing the purposes of Title VII on two fronts. First, it
is unlikely that an employer could select a physical test with discrimi-
natory intent that would both achieve its aims and survive judicial
scrutiny. An employer could not simply choose to test skills at which
149 Griggs, 401 US 424; Albemarle, 422 US 405; Washington, 426 US 229; Dothard, 433 US
321; Beazer, 440 US 568.
150 Griggs, 401 US at 431.
151 Dothard,433 US at 331-32 n 14.
152 Dothard left open the possibility that strength might be a valid business necessity for
employment as a prison guard but found that the test selected to measure strength (height and
weight requirements) was not "job related." See 433 US at 331-32.
153 Griggs, 401 US at 436.
154 See Spiropoulos, 74 NC L Rev at 1485 (cited in note 6) (noting that the objectives of Ti-
tle VII were to remove "artificial barriers" to employment).
155 For an introduction to this topic, see Susan S. Gover, The Business Necessity Defense in
Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 Ga L Rev 387 (1996).
156 See Spiropoulos, 74 NC L Rev at 1528-29 (cited in note 6) (arguing that Title VII was in-
tended to balance employer needs while preventing discrimination).
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men excel if those skills are not a business necessity.L7 Alternatively,
the employer could not create a test slanted to benefit males. If the
employer created a test that did not accurately measure a skill neces-
sary for job performance, that test would be struck down as not job
related. And if an attempt were made to manipulate cutoff scores to
avoid hiring female employees, the test again would be invalid under
the job relatedness prong because the placement of the cutoff score
would not be rationally related to the skill being tested."
Even if disparate impact analysis is also thought necessary to
prevent hidden, subconscious stereotypes from unfairly discriminating
against women, the two-prong test will still likely remedy the problem.
Since the employer must in any event demonstrate content validity as
to an employment test's make-up, any test implemented without fore-
thought will have virtually no chance of viability.
Second, this test is likely to reduce error costs since it both clari-
fies and limits the inquiry courts must make.' ° A disparate impact in-
quiry can create error costs in either of two directions. Courts might
underenforce the statute, permitting discriminatory practices and re-
ducing confidence in public agencies.'' On the other hand, courts
might overenforce the statute, leading to costly validation procedures
or the selection of unqualified applicants, which, in turn, would reduce
the effectiveness of law enforcement or fire protection.
The two-prong test balances these concerns by requiring judges
to seek answers to questions they are likely to resolve correctly. It may
be difficult for a court to determine, based on competing statistical
displays, whether a police officer must run a mile in eight minutes, ten
minutes, or fifteen minutes in order to successfully perform her job, as
would be required under the minimum qualifications test. It should be
much less difficult for a court to determine (a) that endurance is (or is
not) a critical aspect of employment as a police officer and (b) that a
1.5 mile test does (or does not) approximate job conditions the aver-
157 See Berkman v City of New York, 705 F2d 584, 588 (2d Cir 1983) (upholding district
court finding that physical test that emphasized anaerobic and male-preferring skills was invalid
under Title VII).
158 See Legault v aRusso, 842 F Supp 1479,1488 (D NH 1994) (finding that four-part agility
test did not test job skills based on their relative importance to the job of firefighter).
159 See Pietras v Board of Fire Commissioners, 180 F3d 468,472 (2d Cir 1999) (blocking ar-
bitrary selection of hose drag time). In addition, after-the-fact manipulation would probably cre-
ate evidence of disparate treatment.
160 For a discussion of error costs and judicial competence, see Richard A. Posner, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Sex Discrimination, 56 U Chi L Rev 1311 (1989).
161 See Colker, 19 UC Davis L Rev at 772-75 (cited in note 60) (discussing historical gen-
der-based segregation in police and fire departments); Flynn, Despite Recruiting, Few Women Do
Well, NY Tunes at Al (cited in note 61) (discussing efforts to improve hiring of females in New
York City fire department); David Holmstron, Women Officers Arrest the Gender Gap, Christian
Science Monitor 11 (Jan 12,2000) (noting that presence of women may improve police forces).
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age police officer must endure.' 2 The two-prong test is thus not only
consistent with the statutory mandate and Supreme Court precedent,
but also with easy implementation and prevailing notions of judicial
competence.
4. Unlikely to compromise public safety.
While the proposed test does not endorse the Spurlock doctrine's
emphasis on public safety and efficiency, it does essentially incorpo-
rate safety and efficiency concerns through the "business necessity"
prong of the employer defense. For example, a police department
would still be allowed to implement a running requirement clearly
motivated by concerns about criminals eluding pursuit and embar-
rassing media attention.' In effect, the test does grant some deference
to employers in seeking to justify their employment practices if they
are testing skills that will create the safest and most efficient police
and fire departments.
C. Application of the Proposed Test
1. Within the physical test context.
Under the proposed two-prong test, most of the cases discussed
in Part IH of this Comment would still be decided in the same way.
For example, the Hardy court would merely determine under the first
prong that strength and climbing skills were necessary for the job of
an Oakland police officer and then recognize, as it did, that a test re-
quiring climbing a six-foot wall is job related because it closely ap-
proximates those tasks. In a few cases, however, this refined analysis
would yield different results. The court in Eison, for example, would
recognize that while physical fitness was a "business necessity" for a
police officer, measuring that skill through push-ups, sit-ups, and an
obstacle course that do not closely approximate actual job tasks cre-
ates a test not sufficiently job related to withstand Title VII scrutiny.
A case like Lanning might also be decided differently under the two-
prong test. While the court there required that the test itself be a busi-
ness necessity, the two-prong test would probably deem endurance
running to be a skill necessary for successful job performance. Based
162 To sustain such a test, a court could rely either on internal department records that such
runs occurred on the job or testimony from experts conducting a job analysis that such a run
would simulate actual job conditions. See 29 CFR § 1607.14(C)(2) (1999) (describing technical
components and standards of a job analysis).
163 Indeed, Lanning appears to be one of the few physical test cases where clear evidence
indicated the test was not established for any discriminatory purpose. Compare Legault v Zam-
barano, 105 F3d 24,26-28 (1st Cir 1997) (affirming Rule 11 and discovery sanctions against at-
torneys and defendants for concealing that invalidated physical test was a "mirage").
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on the validation tests entered into evidence by SEPTA, a court would
likely conclude that a 1.5 mile run closely approximates such actual
job tasks as officer backups and running assists and that the twelve
minute cutoff time was not selected arbitrarily.'&, The proposed test
improves upon the minimum qualifications test by recognizing that it
is only the skill tested that must be "consistent with business neces-
sity" while the testing mechanism selected must be "job related."
2. Outside the physical test context.
Finally, while the focus of this Comment has been on establishing
a business necessity test and its ramifications in the context of em-
ployer physical ability tests, the two-prong test proposed here could
easily be applied to all Title VII disparate impact claims. Most other
challenged employment screens are either general qualifications re-
quirements or written tests. In either of these cases, the basic analysis
would begin by questioning whether the skill the employer claimed to
be testing was one that would be necessary for safe and efficient job
performance.
At the second stage, the court would then inquire whether the
test itself was "job related" in that it accurately measured the skill de-
sired. The inquiry might be slightly different in the physical and non-
physical contexts, but, in either case, the EEOC guidelines could pro-
vide guidance for test validation.'65 In many cases, the question would
be identical to that found in the physical ability context: Does the test
closely approximate an actual job task? If so, the test will survive judi-
cial scrutiny. Even if it did not, some higher-order thinking tests might
still be upheld through construct or criterion validation.'6 The princi-
ples behind the two-prong test, however, would remain the same.
164 Each of the two hundred SEPTA officers averaged 9.6 backups (run as paced jogs) and
1.9 running assists (run as fast as possible while maintaining sufficient reserve energy) per year.
See Lanning v Southern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 9388, *13-
14 (E D Pa), revd, 181 F3d 478 (3d Cir 1999).
165 See 29 CFR § 1607.14 (1999) (outlining technical standards for validating employment
tests).
166 See id. See also Williams v Ford Motor Co, 187 F3d 533,539-41 (6th Cir 1999) (noting
that criterion studies examine "whether performance on [a] test adequately correlates with per-
formance on the job" in holding that a battery of mental and physical tests was both content and
criterion valid). Construct validity studies are best used for difficult-to-test but important traits
such as creativity and require extensive validation. See Zamlen v City of Cleveland, 906 F2d 209,
218 (6th Cir 1990); 29 CFR § 1607.14(D).
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CONCLUSION
The courts and Congress alike have struggled with Supreme
Court precedent formulating the business necessity defense because
of the frequent failure to differentiate between the two different
strands of analysis that have gone into that defense: business necessity
and job relatedness. Courts should utilize a test that accounts for both
of these strands. When an employer defends a physical test that has a
disparate impact on a protected class, the employer should be re-
quired to demonstrate both that it is attempting to test a skill consis-
tent with its business necessity and that it has selected a test that
closely approximates actual job-related tasks.
)
